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THERE IS A QUASI-"GENRE" of passages in which Aquinas distinguishes varieties of analogy in a theological 
context. In several works across his career, he introduces 
analogy as the crucial part of an answer to a question 
about how to understand the relationship between creatures and 
God. The elaborations of analogy in these various passages 
share at least three common features: (1) they locate analogy 
between univocation and equivocation; (2) they classify at least 
two, and sometimes more, different kinds of analogy, often with 
examples of each kind; and (3) they indicate that one of the 
kinds of analogy thus distinguished is the one most relevant to 
understanding divine naming. 1 Six such passages which are 
often discussed are (in chronological order): I Sentences, d. 19, 
q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4 (in this case, no 
examples are given); De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11; De Potentia Dei, q. 
7, a. 7; Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 34; and Summa Theologiae 
I, q. 13, a. 5. 
Scholars today typically treat one text in this genre-one of 
the most detailed and apparently comprehensive passages on 
1 Different commentators have explored individual texts with great care. To give just 
two examples: I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1 is the main subject of Lawrence Dewan, "St. 
Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician," in idem, Form and Being: 
Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
Anterica Press, 2006),81-95; De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7 is treated at length by Mark Jordan 
in "The Names of God and the Being of Names," in Alfred Freddoso, ed., The Existence 
and Nature of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
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analogy in all of Aquinas-as idiosyncratic and unrepresentative 
of Aquinas's thought. The prevailing view is that question 2, 
article 11 of De Veritate represents an approach to analogy 
which Aquinas only temporarily entertained, and soon 
abandoned. As John Wippel describes this view in his magis-
terial treatment of Aquinas's metaphysics: "lVIost more recent 
scholars regard this particular discussion of Thomas as un-
characteristic his earlier and later thinking on analogical 
predication of the divine names, and hence as not reflecting 
definitive position.,,2 
It is intriguing to find it so widely accepted that Aquinas 
changed his mind about analogy-indeed that changed it 
twice, soon before and soon after writing one of his most 
extensive elaborations of a classification of analogy. In this 
paper I will discuss Aquinas's classification of analogy in De 
Veritate, and summarize reasons that recent scholars have 
given for regarding this classification as atypicaL While the text 
does appeal to the notion of "proportionality" in a way that the 
other texts do not, we will see that the other texts are diverse 
enough that De Veritate hardly seems to deserve to be singled 
out. Then, by offering some philosophical clarifications about 
the notion of proportionality, I will show that the teaching of 
De Veritate is, in principle, philosophically consistent with 
Aquinas's teachings on analogy other places, and further that 
there are good theological and philosophical reasons why 
Aquinas might emphasize different things in this passage than he 
might in other passages that are otherwise similar. The 
hypothesis that Aquinas changed his mind about analogy turns 
out to be unnecessary once we take sufficient account of his 
attention to dialectical context. 
2 John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DoC: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 5530 As Wippel's footnotes make 
clear, the modern consensus has roots in the work of Klubertanz, Lyttkens, and 
especially Montagnes, the last to be discussed belowo 
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L DE VERITATE, Q. 2, A 11 AND ITS COUSINS 
In the Disputed Questions on Truth) question 2, article 11, 
Aquinas raises the question of how a predicate, this case 
"knowledge" (scientia), can apply both to creatures and to God. 
The burden of his answer-as always when he poses this sort of 
question for himself-rests squarely on notion of analogy. 
In the body of the article, he first explains analogy in general, 
introducing it as a mean between univocal and equivocal 
predication. He then distinguishes several varieties of analogy in 
order to indicate which one is relevant to the case of predicating 
names of both creatures and God. 
It is the second part of the discussion, about different 
varieties of analogy, that concerns us. Aquinas first distinguishes 
two sorts of analogy, according as whether the agreement 
between the analogous things is (1) an agreement of proportion 
or a determinate relation (e.g., 2 is the double of 1; urine is 
healthy as the cause of health in the animal); or (2) an 
agreement of proportionality, or relation of proportions (e.g., 6 
is to 3 as 4 is to 2; or "sight" is predicated of the intellect be-
cause understanding is to the intellect as physical sight is to the 
eye). This latter sort of agreement, agreement of pro-
portionality, is further subdivided into: (2a) metaphor, when 
the word as applied to one analogate implies something that 
cannot be affirmed of the other (as is the case when the 
term "lion" is predicated of God); and (2b) another sort, not 
given a technical name but obviously a more proper or genuine 
form of analogy, obtaining when what is implied by the term as 
affirmed of one analogate can be appropriately affirmed of 
another analogate. Giving examples for each type and subtype, 
Aquinas concludes by answering his question, that knowledge 
can be predicated of God in the way mentioned, "according 
to an agreement of proportionality," in the nonmetaphorical, or 
properly analogical, wayo 
The classification of analogy in this text can thus 
schematized as follows (including Aquinas's own descriptions 
and examples): 
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CLASSIFICATIONS OF ANALOGY IN 
DE VER1TATE (1256-59), Q, 2, A, 11, CORP. 
Designation Description Examples 
(1) agreement of agreement between two 
" 
2 is the double of 1 
proportion things with a 
m "being" [predicated of determinate distance or 




of urine and animal] 
(2) agreement of agreement between two 
" 
6 is related to 4 
proportionality proportions because 6:3::4:2 
9 "sight" [predicated of 
eye and intellect] 
(2a) metaphor the definition of one "lion" [predicated of 
implies something that lion and God] 
cannot be in the other 
(metaphor) 
(2b) the definition implies .. "being," "good" 
nothing that cannot be [predicated of creature 
in both and God] 
Like the passage summarized here, the other five passages 
mentioned above distinguish different sorts of analogy in order 
to show which sort applies to God. All of them but the one 
from distinction 35 of book 1 of the Sentences commentary also 
illustrate these different sorts with examples, and do so with the 
apparent intention of explaining and articulating some 
important points about analogy, rather than simply recalling or 
eliciting assent to already accepted doctrines. For my purposes 
it will be sufficient for me to summarize the teachings of these 
other five texts in the same simple table format. 
PROPORTIONALITY AND DIVINE NAt\1ING 535 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ANALOGY IN FIVE THEOLOGICAL TEXTS 
L I Sent. (1252-56), d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1 
Designation Description Examples 
(1) according to the intention refers to many 
" 
"health" [predicated 
intention, and not by order of priority and of animal, urine, 
according to being posteriority, but has being and diet] 
only in one 
(2) according to many equated in common ., "body" [predicated 
being, and not intention, which does not of corruptible bodies 
according to have the same being in all and incorruptible 
intention bodies] 
(3) according to neither a common intention 
'" 
"being" [predicated 
intention and nor same being, a common of substance and 
according to being nature with greater and accident] 
lesser perfection 
2. I Sent. (1252-56), d. 35, q. 1, a. 4 
Designation Description Examples 
(1) agreement in some one thing, according to 
an order of priority 
(2) one is an appropriate imitation of the other 
3. De Potentia Dei (1259-1268), q. 7, a. 7, corp. 
Designation Description Examples 
(1) predicated of two two things must be @ "being" [predicated 
with respect to a third preceded by something of quantity and 
to which each of them quality with respect 
bears some relation to substance] 
(2) predicated of two one of the two must 
" 
"being" [predicated 
because of a precede the other of substance and 
relationship between the quantity] 
two 
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4. contra Gentiles (1259/60-1264/65) I, c. 34 





medicine, food, and 
urine in relation to 
animal] 
(2) one-to-another .. "being" [predicated 
of substance and 
accident] 
(2a) order of reality same as 
'" 
"being" [predicated 
order of naming of substance and 
accident] 
(2b) order of reality 
" 
"healthy" 
different from order of [predicated of 
nammg medicine and 
animal] 
5. Summa Theologiae (1266-68), I, q. 13, a. 
Designation Description Examples 
(1) many-to-one 
" 
"healthy" [predicated of 
medicine and urine in 
relation to body] 
(2) one-to-another s "healthy" [predicated of 
medicine and animal] 
To present the teaching of the texts in this format is to distill 
theoretical structures from the prose and larger context in 
which they are presented; later we need to take some 
account of what is ignored in this summary. Acknowledging 
that inherent limitation, we can say each table here 
portrays Aquinas's own presentation of divisions of 
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analogy. In each case, the table preserves Aquinas's designations 
for the distinguished (where given), his explanations or 
descriptions for each (again, where given), and the examples 
uses to illustrate each type of analogy (once again, where given). 
The first thing to note about the classification schemes of 
these five other texts is that in no obvious way do they provide 
a uniform background against the De Veritate passage 
jumps out in stark relief. The most uniformity is in the 
three passages-from De Potentia Dei, Summa contra Gentiles 
and Summa Theologiae-which use essentially the same 
terminology to make (what seem to be) the same sorts of 
(Though even here, ScG employs an apparently 
significant subdistinction not employed in De Pot. or 5Th.) AJI 
three of these texts use terminology that differs from that of the 
two Sentences passages of De Veritate. 
It also appears that what differs among the six passages is not 
just the terminology but also the of conceptual 
distinctions that are being made. The first passage has three 
different divisions according to different answers to the 
overlapping questions of whether the analogy is or is not 
"according to intention" and "according to being." In the 
second passage, reference to one thing is contrasted with 
imitation. In De Veritate, as we have seen, the contrast is 
between proportion and proportionality. In the three texts, 
we have variations on many-to-one versus one-to-another 
relations. 
As further evidence that these are not just different verbal 
formulations for the same consistent theoretical distinctions, we 
may notice that different phenomena find a place in different 
divisions. So, for instance, the first Sentences passage, and only 
this passage in the group, a place for what is formally a 
case of univocation3 (type "body" predicated of corruptible 
3 Univocation can be a form of analogy from a "metaphysical" as opposed to 
"logical" point of view: while a stone and a man are equally bodies ("body" behaves 
logically univocally, signifying corporeity in both the stone and the man) they are not 
equal bodies-indeed, the actual significate of "body" in man (his corporeity, which is 
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and incorruptible bodies). Only the classification in De Veritate 
finds a place its classification scheme for metaphor (2a). 
Complicating matters even further, the passages make 
different uses of examples. In the first Sentences passage, divine 
names are said to like "being" as said of substance and 
accident, but the divine names are distinguished from "being" as 
said of substance and accident in the Summa contra Gentiles 
and De Veritate. Likewise "being" and "healthy" illustrate the 
same type of analogy in the De Veritate examples, but they il-
lustrate different types of analogy in the first Sentences passage) 
and the contra Gentiles. 
Even those texts that are fairly similar in their formal 
divisions use examples quite differently. In De Potentia, "being" 
is an example of types of analogy, but in the Summa 
contra Gentiles "healthy" is an example of both major divisions 
(1 and 2b) while "being" is only an example of one kind (2a). In 
the Summa Theologiae, "healthy" illustrates both kinds, and 
"being" is not used as an example at all. Since in each 
classification the last mode of analogy characterized is supposed 
to apply to the relation between creatures and God, we find 
divine names likened in one passages to "being" (I Sent., d. 19), 
while in another passage divine names are said to operate 
otherwise than "being" (ScG), and in two passages divine 
naming operates like some cases of "being" but unlike others 
(De Verii'. and De Pot.). 
Given the obvious diversity of Aquinas's classifications of 
analogy, it is not surprising to find scholars either arguing that 
there is a lack of a consistent teaching, or employing creative 
interpretation to some passages more compatible than 
they may first appear. What would be surprising, at least to 
someone first introduced to these texts, would be the notion 
that De Veri tate stands out as the one text which differs from 
the others and is therefore unrepresentative of Aquinas's views. 
his human soul, given the thesis of the unicity of substantial form) is of a higher grade of 
reality than the actual significate of "body" in the stone. See Armand Maurer, "St. 
Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," The New Scholasticism 29 (1955); 127-44. 
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And yet this is the case made by several scholars starting in 
the 1950s-not incidentally, often as part of a criticism of 
Cajetan's analogy theory, cites the text from De Veritate 
as an authority. Studies by Hampus Lyttkens and George 
Klubertanz are important sources for 4 but one of the 
most influential interpreters of these passages is Bernard 
Montagnes.5 
II. MONTAGNES'S APPROACH TO AQUINAS'S 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ANALOGY 
lvl.ontagnes interprets the texts at issue as different attempts 
to answer a consistent question about what kind of unity 
between creatures and God. Finding different answers 
to the same question, Montagnes proposes an account of how 
Aquinas's views In his interpretation, the historical 
progression of the texts reveals two movements in 
Aquinas's thought. First, a unity of likeness (in the Sentences 
commentary) is replaced by a unity of proportionality (in De 
Veritate). Second, a unity of proportionality is replaced by talk 
of reference to one or "analogy of relation" (in subsequent 
texts). 
Montagnes understands the first move (from likeness to 
proportionality) as prompted Aquinas's realization that 
likeness could imply a common form, some one thing in 
reference to which both analogates are defined, or one defined 
in terms of the other. Since sharing a common factor would 
4 Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its 
Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino (UppsaJa: AImqvist and 
Wiksells Boktrycheri AB, 1952); and George p, Klubertanz, Saint Thomas Aquinas on 
Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 
1960), 
5 Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de l'analogie de l'fitre dOapres Saint Thomas 
d'Aquin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1963), For 
English translation see Bernard Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being 
according to Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans, E. M, Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2004), 
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ultimately imply Aquinas experimented with the 
four-term proportionality relationship as a way of describing 
likeness that safeguards divine transcendence. 
The second move (from proportionality to analogy of 
relation) Montagnes argues is by further realizations 
about the metaphysics of participation. Proportionality may 
have safeguarded transcendence, but at the expense of 
the intrinsic connection and direct relation between creature 
and creator. According to Montagnes, the development of 
Aquinas's metaphysics, especially understanding of causality 
and the notion of the act of being, prompted him to replace 
"proportionality" explanation with an account in terms of 
participation. 6 
6 Here is Montagnes summarizing his view in his own words: "In order to ' , , bring 
to the fore the philosophical significance of the doctrinal progress it reveals, we can say 
that the De Veri tate functions as an extension of the Sentences, There Thomas accepts 
the same formalist conception according to which the principle relation of beings to 
God is that of imitation, but he grasps the danger that it presents: more or less to 
confuse the creature with the creator and to succumb to the univocity to which our 
conceptual processes incline us, There is only one means to eliminate this danger: to 
accentuate the distance, to deny all direct likeness, to refuse every sort of determinate 
relation, At what price, then, does one safeguard the divine transcendence? By radically 
separating beings from God, by accentuating the distance to the point of rupture, by 
running the risk of equivocity and agnosticism, Neither theologically nor philosophically 
is this a satisfactory solution: it annihilates our knowledge of God; it eliminates the 
unity of being, The cause of this is the underlying metaphysics which inspires the 
solution, To escape this impasse, one had to conceive being no longer as form but as act, 
and causality no longer has the likeness of the copy to the model [i,e, original] but as the 
dependence of one being on another being which produces it, Now this is exactly what 
efficient causality implies: exercised by a being in act, it makes a new being exist in act, 
which being is not confounded with the first, since the effect and the cause each exist on 
its own account, but which communicates with it in the act, since the act of the agent 
becomes that of the patient, At the same time the act is that which the effect has in 
common with the cause and that by which it is not identified with it, Thus, it is by a 
veritable communication of being that God produces creatures and creative causality 
establishes between beings and God the indispensable bond of participation so that there 
might be an analogy of relation between them, It will no longer be necessary to have 
recourse to analogy of proportion[ality], and Thomas will never come back to the 
theory of the De Veritate" (Macierowski, trans" 78; corresponds to French edition, 91-
92]), 
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To appreciate the influence of Montagne's interpretation, we 
may note briefly how it has been received, by 
two recent interpreters of Aquinas. John Wippel follows 
Montagnes's approach to accounting for the diversity among 
these passages, differing mainly in that he finds a closer affinity 
between the earlier appeal to likeness and the later 
understanding of participation rooted a causal connection.7 
According to Wippel, the earlier (I Sent" d. 35) distinction 
sharing a common factor imitation is just an 
alternative formulation of what is later referred to in terms of 
the distinction between analogical relations that are many-to-
one and those that are one-to-another. 8 Wippel agrees with 
Montagnes that the De Veritate appeal to proportionality leaves 
God too distant from creatures; as a proposed solution to the 
problem of the relationship between creatures and God, it is not 
as successful in staving off agnosticism as other formulations. 9 
So, according to Wippel, it makes sense that Aquinas would 
move to a preference for analogy of one to another, because in 
such cases the causal connection guarantees a likeness, which 
need not be a specific or generic likeness, between cause and 
effect, Like Montagnes then, Wippel finds that Aquinas, in 
grappling with the relationship between creatures and God, 
gained a better understanding of "the ontological situation" 
after De Veritate,JO abandoning analogy of proportionality in 
favor of analogy of direct attribution founded in a causal 
relation. 
Gregory Rocca also reviews Aquinas's invocations of analogy 
in characterizing the relationship between creatures and God, 
and he too finds Thomas experimenting very briefly with the 
notion of proportionality, but then settling on analogy of 
7 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas; see especially his treatment of 
divine names (543-75) and the analogy of being (73-93), along with the chapter on 
participation (94-131). 
8 Ibid., 547. Wippel finds in another text (De Veritate, q. 23, not considered here) a 
softer, nonexclusive appeal to proportionality. 
9 Ibid., 554. 
10 Ibid., 568, 575. 
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or a relation to one.]] Like Wippel, sees 
consistency of emphasis on a direct relation between God and 
creatures, allowing intrinsic causal connections, in texts before 
and after De Veritate. For Rocca, Aquinas struggled with the 
problem of describing God's relationship with creatures, 
eventually finding a solution "retooling" the notion of 
"proportio" to cover a broader range of relationships than strict 
proportionality had allowed.]2 Rocca admits, Aquinas's 
reasons for shifting his preference from analogy of 
proportionality to analogy of analogy attribution (or what 
Rocca prefers to call "referential are only 
"implicit,,,13 Rocca supplies two: first, proportional 
similarity functions "as a genus or quasi-genus" and such a 
generic notion "must . . . eventually be grounded in the 
multivocal analogy of direct rapport"; second, there seems to 
an epistemological dependence of knowledge learned VIa 
proportionality on knowledge learned more directly.14 
11 Gregory Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the 
Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2004). 
12 "What Aquinas' ultimate solution hiuges on, even in its earliest stages, is his ability 
to retool and expand the meaning of propOitio, which from its infancy in Greek 
philosophy had been closely tied to finding the exact ratios between finite numbers, and 
to be comfortable enough with its extended sense not to forget it when confronted with 
God's infinity, for as we have seen, he only decides for proportionality when he also 
ignores the broad sense of proportion. This broad sense of proportio as 'direct relation' 
is the bridge that allows theological attributes to cross from us to God and, more 
generally, is the philosopher's stone Aquinas utilizes to transmute analogia as four-term 
proportionality into analogia as referential multivocity" (ibid., 123). 
13 Ibid., 125. Cf. K1ubertanz, Saint Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 94-95: "Nothing 
can be explicitly found in the existing texts which gives any reason for St. Thomas' 
temporary adherence to proportionality." 
14 Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 125-27. Rocca seems to downplay (as 
an occasional "secondary formulation") those places where Aquinas makes clear that 
there is proportionality in the analogy between accident and substance (ibid., 125, and 
n. 77)0 His point seems to be that the relation of proportionality here depends on a 
more fundamental and direct relation, which on page 132 he describes in terms of 
imitation. 
PROPORTIONALITY AND DIVINE NAMING 
HI. AN ALTERNATIVE ApPROACH TO INTERPRETING 
DE VERITATE, Q. 2, 11 
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In summarizing their accounts of the significance of De 
Veritate among Aquinas's accounts analogy in divine naming, 
scholars sometime describe Aquinas as reversing his position 
about the priority of proportionality or attribution. But, to be 
precise, it is not the case that Aquinas in texts other than De 
Veritate makes the same distinction he makes there, and then 
prioritizes analogy of attribution (analogy of direct proportion) 
over analogy of proportionality, Instead, what we find is that 
Aquinas explicitly invokes "proportionality" to classify a 
privileged kind of analogy in De Veritate, and does not 
invoke proportionality at all-either as a privileged or as a 
nonprivileged form of analogy-in some of the other key texts. 
In other words, rather than reversing priority of a consistent 
classification scheme, Aquinas appears simply to drop the 
classification scheme of De Veritate and replace it with a 
different classification scheme (or schemes). If this is a 
"reversal" it is a more subtle or quiet one. 
One might also note there are a couple common but 
questionable assumptions behind this strategy of interpreting De 
Veritate relative to the other comparable texts. The first is that 
in each text Aquinas attempts to give the comprehensive 
essential classification of analogy. Only from this assumption 
would it follow that different classifications are not compatible. 
But alternatively one could assume that Aquinas does not mean 
each classification to be comprehensive, or they are 
comprehensive in different ways, perhaps because the classi-
fications are made in terms of different kinds of criteria, serving 
different purposes. 
Thus we see another assumption at work these 
interpretations: the various passages are each attempts to 
answer the very same question. Montagnes makes 
explicit, insisting that the texts are "strictly 
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parallel,"15 not just in the sense that I taken them, as 
having parallel structures of but as dialectically 
parallel, For is "a" problem of 
divine naming and De 
Veritate's "solution" to that one problem is only a provisional 
one "displaced" the mature "definitive" of later 
texts. 
\.Xlippel retains this assumption, although IS 
more aware that the dialectical contexts of the relevant texts 
differ: notes that in "the more mature" examples, Aquinas's 
consideration of divine names comes after discussion 
quidditative knowledge of God. 16 Rocca is also more attuned to 
the fact that different passages may have different dialectical 
even so, he retains the assumption that various 
texts should be read as evidence of Aquinas returning to the 
same basic question and negotiating a choice, between analogy 
as attribution and analogy as proportionality, as providing the 
answer to that question, 17 
An alternative hermeneutic strategy is available: to take each 
text as designed to make' those distinctions relevant to 
addressing a given problem, and to assume that the given 
problem is not necessarily the same in each case. For a proper 
appreciation of the dialectical context of Aquinas's distinctions, 
it is not necessarily enough to look at title questions of the 
relevant articles in which they are made, medieval teachers 
knew very well, a given proposition can only interpreted in 
light of the larger dialectical context in which it arises, 
Aquinas's different claims about how something can be 
predicated of God and creatures thus do not have to be 
interpreted as, and should not be assumed to be, different 
attempts to address the same one question, There may be a 
cluster of questions, or a general question which could be 
answered on different levels depending on what specific 
dimension of question is most relevant in a given situation, 
15 Montagnes, Doctrine o( the Analogy o( Being, 63-64 (French ed., 66-67). 
10 Wippel, Metaphysics o(Thomas Aquinas, 543-44. 
j 7 Rocca, Speaking the Incornprehensible God, 118. 
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If this is the case, classification schemes that are very 
different may in fact be philosophical compatible, and need 
imply no inconsistency or development. J 8 
IV. CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT PROPORTIONALITY 
Before proceeding alternative hermeutic strategy 
and attending to particular dialectical contexts, it is also 
important to establish some theoretical clarifications about 
18 In general, we must remember that Aquinas's discussions of analogy are always 
occasional-analogy is usually brought in as a solution to a particular problem, a 
problem that is itself located in a larger dialectical context. It is inappropriate, then, to 
ask what Aquinas's theory or doctrine of analogy was, if that implies a fully explicated, 
stand-alone theory, though we can still ask what he taught about analogy. We only have 
to remember that what Aquinas taught about analogy cannot be separated from the 
question of how he taught it. (It may not be incidental to his teaching on analogy, after 
all, that he did not choose to write a treatise on analogy, and it may even be that a 
systematic textbook treatment of the topic would somehow falsify the wisdom 
contained in Aquinas's more organic discussions.) And how Aquinas teaches about 
analogy is largely a question of where he teaches about it-that is: in what kinds of 
texts, in what dialectical circumstances, does Aquinas find it useful to bring up analogy, 
and what role does analogy play in those dialectical circumstances? (There are so many 
occasions, so many places where analogy is either briefly invoked or elaborately 
discussed, that it is difficult to take account of them all. Klubertanz's study is still the 
most comprehensive review of relevant texts, although other texts could be added, e.g. 
Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Libras Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum 
Expositio II, lect. 17, n. 4.) 
While the present article deals with a set of theological texts, it should not be 
forgotten that analogy plays a role in a variety of other kinds of texts, including 
treatises, like De Principiis Naturae, and commentaries on Aristotle (e.g., on the 
Metaphysics and Ethics), as well as theological texts where divine naming is not the 
primary focus. Any careful examination of Aquinas would also have to take account of 
where analogy does not appear, or where the topic appears under different guises 
without being labeled "analogia." (It is not often appreciated, for instance, that Aquinas 
discusses analogy, as a kind of unity, in De Principiis Naturae, a work of natural 
philosophy, while his De Ente et Essentia-which considers the diverse meanings of 
being, and its application not only across the categories but also to a self-subsisting 
nature-never refers to these relations [of words, or of things 1 as cases of analogy; 
indeed in this metaphysical and theological work the word "analogia" and its cognates 
make no appearance at alL) 
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notion of proportionality and its relation to the logical and 
metaphysical orders. 
(1) First, as noted, proportionality involves a four-term 
O'-"H .. "H~ describing a relation of relations: A is to B as C is to D. 
Originally a mathematical notion, this was extended to 
nonmathematical domains as a way of describing likenesses that 
do not involve a common form or a generic similarity. Two 
things are proportionally similar not insofar as they each have a 
share in the same quality, but insofar as they find in 
relations or proportions are similar-A is proportionally 
to C insofar as A is to B as C is to D. Contemporary 
philosophers have referred to phenomenon as 
morphy."19 Two things are understood to be isomorphic not if 
they share a common trait, but if they play similar roles or find 
themselves in similar relationships to other things in their 
respective domains. 20 In short, four-term proportionality is a 
19 L lv1. Bochenski, "On Analogy," The Thomist (1948): 425-77, §17. (I cite this 
work by section number as it has been reprinted, with corrections, in Albert lvlenne, ed., 
Logico-Philosophical Studies [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1962]; and in James F. Ross, ed., 
Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke 
[Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971]: 99-122). Cf. 1. M. Bochenski, A 
History of Formal Logic, trans. Ivo Thomas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1961),397, commenting on a discussion of "systematic ambiguity" from Principia 
Mathematica: "all the statements in question evidently share the same formal structure. 
We have in fact a case of isomorphy. It is remarkable that the name used for this kind of 
isomorphy, 'systematic ambiguity', is an exact translation of the common Scholastic 
expression aequivocatio a consilio, synonymous with 'analogy'; for isomorphy is 
precisely analogy." 
20 It may be possible to argue that some proportional relationships are in lact 
reducible to identity (mathematically, 2/4 equals 4/8) or that there in fact is a common 
quality ("half," shared by 2 with respect to 4 and by 4 with respect to 8), but: (1) the 
assertion of identity is not the same as the assertion of isomorphy (something is lost 
theoretically, even if not quantitively, in reducing 2/4=4/8 to 1/2= 1/2); (2) the identity 
is not the basis of the isomorphy or proportionality (.5 = ,5, but that doesn't make 
them proportional or isomorphic); and (3) it is not always necessary to insist on identity 
to perceive isomorphy or proportionality (the spine of a mammal and the shell of a 
lobster play similar roles for those creatures, though clearly not identical roles; and even 
in mathematics there are proportional relationships that are not reducible to equations, 
for instance circumference:area::surface area:volume). 
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way of describing a relation of likeness that need not involve a 
common quality or form shared by the relata. 
(2) Now suppose that two proportionally similar or 
isomorphic things receive the same name-as, for example, we 
can use the term "river" to denominate both the Thames and 
one of the blue lines on my map of Oxford. the order of 
imposition, this obviously involves the extension of a term from 
one semantic context to another: the Thames is a river in the 
primary sense, and the blue is a the sense that it is 
related to other on the map as 
surrounding topography. But if even in analogy of 
proportionality I extend a term from one analogate to another, 
in a loose sense even analogy proportionalty involves 
"attribution" or denomination of one thing by reference to 
another. Of course, the ability to denominate the secondary 
analogate by "reference" to primary analogate is itself based 
on the discernment of a proportional similarity or isomorphy 
between the secondary analogate (the blue line) and the primary 
analogate (the real river). Thus, applying a common name to 
proportionally similar things always involves, in the order of 
imposition, attribution or reference to one. 
(3) Now note further isomorphy or proportionality 
between items in their respective structures may or may not 
imply an intrinsic connection, or causal relation, between those 
items. There may be a causal connection, as in the case of the 
map, which was produced intentionally to represent the 
mapped territory. But there need not be any causal connection. 
Consider two classic examples of proportionality, that a captain 
is to his ship as a governor is to the commonwealth, and that 
physical vision is to the eye as intellectual vision is to the 
intellect. In these cases, the proportionally related things have 
no metaphysical connection. The captain (or his relationship to 
the ship) is in no way causally linked to the governor (or his 
relationship to the commonwealth); and physical and 
intellectual vision are similar without one causing, or otherwise 
being intrinsically related, to other. So we must further 
remember that discerning a formal relationship of proportional 
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likeness between two things does not address the metaphysical 
question of whether those two things are causally related. 
(4) If, in at least some cases, there is no intrinsic or 
metaphysical connection between two proportionally related 
things, it is still the case that two noncausally related but 
proportionally similar analogates may be intrinsically 
denominated a common term, that is, denominated by that 
term on account of a relevant proportional "formality" found in 
each analogate. Intellectual and physical sight are not 
intrinsically related, but we extend the term "seeing" 
from the primary analogate (the eye which sees) to the 
secondary analogate (the intellect which understands), we 
denominate the intellect as "seeing" because of its own intrinsic 
act grasping intellectual objects. Even' in the order of 
imposition, denominating the intellect as seeing we make 
reference to an extrinsic (and metaphysically independent) 
primary analogate (the eye's physical vision), it remains the case 
that in the order of signification the analogical term ("seeing") is 
predicated of the secondary analogate intellect) on account 
of that secondary analogate's own act (the intellect's 
understanding). sum, we must not confuse the metaphysical 
issue of an intrinsic connection between two things, and the 
semantic issue of the intrinsic denomination of something, 21 
(5) Furthermore, those cases in which there is a causal 
connection between two proportionally similar things, there 
would ipso facto also be a "direct" relation (of cause to effect), 
Two things whose formality of likeness is proportional may as a 
matter of fact be related (as cause to effect), so that in addition 
to their proportional relationship we may say that one is 
directly related to another. Thus, Aquinas holds that the being 
of accidents is caused by the being of substance, but he also 
holds that accidents have their own intrinsic being which is 
proportionally similar to the intrinsic being of substances. 
21 Making a similar point, Rocca calls this "analogy's metaphysical neutrality" 
(Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 129). "For Aquinas, analogy formally understood 
as such is also a logical entity that is neutral as regards the ontological question of 
whether a subject possesses an analogous predicate intrinsically or not" (ibid., 13 n 
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Likewise, while "healthy" is treated as an example of 
analogy of attribution, it would be easy to argue organs 
deserve to be called "healthy" not just by reference to the health 
of the organism of which they are a part, but also by reference 
to their own intrinsic good function, which is proportionally 
similar to the good function of the organism as a whole, But 
such a case, the intrinsic health of the liver is understood to 
directly, causally related to the intrinsic health of the organism 
as a whole (indeed, as both helping to cause, and as being 
caused by), in a way that, for instance, the governor of the state 
is not causally related to the captain of the ship to which is 
proportionally related. So possible that, not only in the 
order of imposition, but of reality, proportionality 
does not rule out a direct or relation between the two 
proportionally related things. 
(6) A relationship of proportionality, which is not a 
determinate relationship but a relation of relations, IS 
nonetheless compatible with the way Aquinas talks about 
analogy of "one to anotheL" Some scholars have attempted to 
treat "one-to-another" and "many-to-one" (or "two-to-a-third") 
as substantive divisions in the mechanism analogical naming 
or as relevant to metaphysical relationship between analogates, 
as if an analogy's being "one-to-another" automatically implies 
something about the nature of the relationship obtains 
between two analogates, Wippel, for instance, assumes that 
Aquinas expresses a preference for analogy of one to another, as 
if that an affirmation of causal connection and a 
rejectlOn of proportionality.22 This confusion may have its roots 
in Montagnes, who begins recognizing the modest logical 
implications of the distinction but attempts to link it to a 
fundamental development in Aquinas's theory of being,23 But 
22 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 561, 565, Cf. John F, Wippel, 
"Metaphysics," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed, Norman Kretzmann and 
Eleonore Stnmp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),92, 
23 Montagnes, Doctrine of the Analogy of Being, 71-72. Steven A, Long's Analogia 
Entis,' On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), otherwise representing a strong critique of 
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the view that describing analogy as "one to another" implies 
something about the metaphysical relationship of the analogates 
is simply not warranted by Aquinas's actual usage. Whenever 
Aquinas appeals to the distinction between "one-to-another" 
and "many-to-one" in analogy (as the examples used in ScC I, c. 
34; STh I, q. 13, a. 5; and De Pot., q. 7, a. 7 show), all that the 
distinction addresses IS the question whether, between two 
analogates, one of is primary by reference to which the 
other is secondary, or both are secondary and need to be 
understood by reference to some other, primary, analogate. 
Whether there is a causal relationship between the analogates, 
and whether the analogates are related proportionality, are 
metaphysical questions, entirely independent of the semantic 
question of whether one of the two analogates is primary. In 
other words, identifying an instance of analogy as "one to 
another" neither entails a causal connection between analogates) 
nor rules out a proportional relationship between analogates. 24 
V. PROPORTIONALITY AND PARTICIPATION 
On the basis of these general theoretical clarifications about 
the nature of proportionality, it is possible to read the 
discussion of analogy at De Veritate, question 2, article 11 not 
.Montagnes, nonetheless perpetuates this confusion by treating "analogy of one to 
another" as a kind of analogy, and one of a piece with analogy of "effect to cause" and 
"analogy of proportion" (e.g., 33-34, 54, 58-59, 63, 76, 79). Ralph McInerny seems to 
understand the notion of analogy of one to another correctly (The Logic of Analogy: An 
Interpretation of St. Thomas [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961], 82), although he 
implicates Cajetan in misreading it as a more substantive division, despite Cajetan's De 
Nominum Analogia, §18, which explains that the distinction between analogy of one to 
another and analogy of two to a third does not address what sort of cause produces the 
analogy, only whether the prime analogate is among those being considered, or the 
analogates considered are all secondary. 
24 The reflections in this section help to account for why the notion of 
proportionality has such a complicated history in relation to the notion of deliberate 
equivocation or analogy as a mean between univocation and equivocation. For a brief 
account of this history see Joshua P. Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy: Rereadirtg 
Cajetan's "De Nominum Analogia" (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2010),4-10. 
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as an experiment with an alternative approach to analogy, 
briefly entertained and then abandoned, but as an analysis of 
analogy on one level that is compatible with the analyses 
of analogy given in other places. For purposes of this argument, 
only brief attention to the relevant contexts is 
necessary. 
The divisions and examples in the passages from the two 
latest texts and STh) appear in similar situations, that is, 
early in general theological works. are to lend 
support to the theological method being defended and 
the method of learning about God by reasoning from 
effects to causes. Not surprisingly, then, their emphasis is on the 
causal relationships between analogates.25 epistemological 
metaphysical issues related to divine naming these passages 
should not be expected to address. 
contrast, the point of the passage from distinction 19 
book 1 of the Sentences is to clarify the differences and relations 
between truth God and truth in creatures. Aquinas's divisions 
and examples there allow him to argue that there is not only 
one truth (first division of analogy), nor are there many 
different truths generically the same (second division), but there 
is one primary truth to which other truths are related although 
they are not generically the same (third division). The 
classification framework gives more detail, because the issue is 
not a general one of a theological method (reasoning from 
effects to cause), but a very specific metaphysical question about 
whether and sense something is actualized in both God 
and creatures. The fact of a relationship of causal dependency 
between analogates, which Aquinas's later texts emphasize as 
part of a method of theological inquiry, is less relevant here. 
Instead, the distinction is designed to make clarifications about 
25 It is also worth pointing out that the divisions of analogy are relatively short 
discussions compared to the reflections on language developed immediately prior to 
them; Jordan points out that they each serve as a kind of "coda" to prior discussions of 
how the divine names work (SeC I, cc. 30-33; STh I, q. 13, aa. 1-4; d. De Pot., q. 7, aa. 
1-6, followed by discussion of analogy in q. 7, a. 7; see Jordan, "Names of God and the 
Being of Names," 168-69; and 186 n. 14). 
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sameness difference both on the metaphysical and on 
the of the semantics of terms, 
The dialectical purpose of the passage from De Veritate is 
quite different again, Here, Aquinas sets up the discussion to 
u\.oJe .... Hu the possibility of a relation between creatures and God 
which is not a "determinate relationship" (habitudo deter-
minata), In other words, although problem is posed in terms 
of predication (and so of logic or semantics), the main 
theological point addressed in the article is not that God and 
creatures are commonly named analogy, but that analogically 
common naming need not imply a "determinate relation" of 
God to creatures. 
This is evident from the objections: the first five of the eight 
objections deny, in different ways, the possibility of 
comparing, or finding likeness between, God and creatures, 
This general objection is made appeal in turn to: Scripture 
(obj. 1), God's infinity (obj. 2), God's simplicity (obj. 3), and the 
infinite distance between creature and God (objs. 4 and 5). In 
reply to such objections, Aquinas needs to talk about the 
possibility of a likeness or comparison between God and 
creatures that does not imply a determinate relationship. The 
evidence for the possibility of some likeness between God and 
creatures is easy to give, from Aristotle's Metaphysics (sed 
contra 1) and from Genesis 1:26 (sed contra 2). And in the body 
of the article, the reality of likeness is further advanced by 
appeal to the facts, not argued for here, that God can know 
creatures through his essence, and that we can learn about God 
from creatures. 
For Aquinas, a "determinate relation" apparently implies 
that the relata could share something in common or be 
considered as elements in a common domain; if such a 
relationship held between God and creatures it would be a 
threat to divine transcendence. So Aquinas here invokes 
"agreement of proportionality" in the body of the article in 
order to explain the possibility a relation, a comparison of 
between God and creatures which is not "determinate" 
in this way, that which still allows a gap or distance between 
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the items; God creatures are similar, in different 
domains. 
It is worth noting this general point whatever 
relation obtains between God and creatures must be "non-
determinate") remains consistent in Aquinas's later theological 
26 And understanding such a relationship in terms of 
proportionality, or a similitude of is also never 
abandoned. though the notion proportionality is rarely 
invoked in other attempts to classify types of analogy, that 
notion remains common currency in Aquinas's discussions of 
the relationship between God creatures. 
Take, for instance, question 14 in the Prima Pars (STh I, q. 
a. 3, ad 2), where Aquinas addresses a sophism regarding 
God's knowledge. We cannot conclude the assertion that 
"God is finite to himself" that God is actually finite, because 
saying that "God is finite to himself" was only meant as a way 
of saying that God was to grasp himself as finite creatures 
can grasp themselves. What we say about God's knowledge, in 
other words, presumes a proportional relationship between God 
and his knowledge, creatures and their knowledge. 
Likewise, in question 3 of the Prima Secundae (STh I-II, q. 3, a. 
5, ad 1), a conclusion about the comparison of human 
and intellect is corrected by restating the schema of 
proportionality. Human practical intellect is God only 
insofar as "it stands in relation to what it knows as God does to 
26 E.g., STh I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4: "Proportion is twofold: in one sense it means a 
certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble, and equal are 
species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called 
proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, 
inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect to its cause, and as potentiality to its act; 
and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God." Cf, De Pot., q. 
7, a. 10, ad 9. It might appear that 5Th I, q. 13, a. 6 denies this, asserting a straight 
proportion between creatures and God, but surely Aquinas does not here mean to 
contradict what he said earlier at STh I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4. At issue in this subsequent 
article is the question of what counts as the primary analogate in divine naming, which 
Aquinas takes as an occasion to distinguish between the order of imposition and the 
order of signification; the question of the nature of the causal relationship between 
creature and God is not at stake here. 
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what knows." In short, when Aquinas it necessary to 
clarify relationship between creatures and God, and 
especially to be precise about we can learn about the one 
from the other, he continues to assert a relation of 
proportionality.27 
But then, it is not difficult to read question 2, article 11 of 
De Veritate as consistent with the other passages we find on 
analogy, and the question of whether one particular passage's 
teaching is so peculiar as not to fit with the others need not 
arise. In De Veritate, the motivating theological points are ones 
are consistent throughout Aquinas's career; in that 
sense, we do not have to treat De Veritate as idiosyncratic or 
unrepresentative of Aquinas's thought. 
Admittedly, only goes so If we no longer have 
reason to say that Aquinas abandoned the central metaphysical 
position articulated in De Veritate, it is still correct to note that 
he seems to have abandoned, or at least de-emphasized, the 
explicit invocation of "proportionality," or the four-term notion 
of relations of proportions, when making recourse to analogy to 
account for divine naming. 
One could hypothesize that this shift is simply due to 
Aquinas's experimentation with different terminology over the 
course of his career, perhaps finding help in a variety of sources 
and experimenting with different ways in which terminology 
from different sources can be combinedo28 But apart from such 
fundamentally philological factors, which may indeed be 
relevant, I want to draw on the clarifications about propor-
tionality articulated above to discern at least one principled 
philosophical reason why Aquinas might find that the 
relationship of "proportionality" serves his purpose particularly 
well in De Veritate, while it is not adequate for his purposes in 
27 Another point that Aqninas never abandons, indeed, which he seems to emphasize 
in later works, is the relation of imitation between creatures and God. It is cited in De 
VeriL, q. 2, a. 11, ad 1, on the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius. 
28 Philip Reynolds has argued a similar case with respect to Bonaventure; d. 
"Bonaventure's Theory of Resemblance," Traditio 58 (2003): 219-56; and "Analogy of 
N ames in Bonaventure," lvlediaeval Studies 65 (2003): 117-62. 
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the majority of other theological contexts in which he employs 
and theorizes about analogy. 
In the of passages we are discussing, Aquinas if 
ever remains only on the level of semantic analysis-his concern 
is not just the function of analogical names, but the natures of 
the things analogically named. Moreover, when two things are 
proportionally similar, the fact of their proportional similarity 
says nothing about the cause of that Two things may 
be proportionally similar because one was produced as a 
representation or imitation of the other-as the contours of a 
map have a proportional relationship to the territory they map, 
because the map-maker deliberately imitated the geography of 
the territory in his map. But, as we have already noted, two 
things proportionally similar may have no intentional, historical 
or causal connection between them. 
In short, the relationship of proportional similarity between 
two things does not imply that one of the two things has a 
causal relationship with, and so a degree of participation in, the 
other. As noted, the eye's vision and the intellect's vision are 
proportionally similar, one is not caused by, and is not 
properly said to imitate or participate in, the other,29 On the 
other hand, if one thing participates in (or is an imitation of) 
another, that does imply that the two are proportionally similar. 
Participation implies imitation or likeness between item 
participating and the item being participated in, and imitation 
or implies isomorphy, that is, unlike media or domains 
within which there are nonetheless comparable relations 
between parts, qualities or items of those media or structures. 
(A picture "imitates" a thing insofar as the relationships 
between parts of a picture "map" the relationships between 
parts of a thing pictured.) 
29 One could make the case that both eye and intellect participate in or imitate divine 
vision/cognition-but discerning this would be a matter of advanced theological insight 
well beyond a characterization of the obvious relationship, more known to us, ben'lfeen 
intellectual and ocular vision; and obviously one can discern the proportional 
relationship between physical and intellectual vision without being aware of or believing 
in a common divine exemplar of each, 
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Aquinas was well aware that the relationship of proportional 
similarity is necessarily implicit in imitation, Defining image as a 
kind of imitation or likeness, he says, 
it is necessary that there be some adequation in that quality [in respect of 
which there is imitation], either according to quality or according to 
proportion; as it is clear that, in a small image, there is an equal proportion of 
parts to each other as in the big thing of which it is the image,30 
So proportionality does not imply a of participation, 
but a relation of participation entail proportionality, 
entailment relationship between participation 
and proportionality helps us appreciate how Aquinas 
characterize in different contexts, as he did, without 
having to inconsistent understandings of analogy, If he 
remained on the "formal" or semantic level of 
might have "proportionality" to characterize 
by analogical concepts, when he discusses 
analogy in theological and metaphysical contexts, he cannot 
aside the "material" or analysis, and so he is 
more likely to "participation" to describe analogical 
relationships between things. Proportionality is inadequate to 
explain the effect's imitation of its cause, which is usually 
Aquinas's concern. However, proportionality-likeness under-
stood as isomorphy, or formal similarity between different kinds 
of or sets-is implicit in the effect's imitation of its cause, 
and does help us to understand how two things can be similar 
without having a "determinate relation" between them, 
Put another way, the metaphysics of participation emphasizes 
causal relationship, attention to the reason one 
thing fact "imitates" another. By contrast, the logic of 
proportionality describes why one thing appears as an imitation 
of another. Better than metaphysical relation of 
partIcIpation, proportionality describes the formality of 
nongeneric likeness or isomorphy, accounting for our ability to 
perceive or discern "imitation." And insofar as Aquinas 
consistently recogmzes relationship of 
30 I Sent" d, 28, g, 2, a, L 
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imitation or participation betViTeen creatures and God, he 
continues to their formal proportionality. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of these observations, we have seen that 
interpreting question 2, 11 of De Veritate as articulating 
a temporary or idiosyncratic view is unnecessary. 
The recent marginalization this passage from De Veritate is 
based on a speculative metanarrative about Aquinas's 
metaphysical development is not required by the is 
based partly on confusions about the nature of proportionality 
its implications in the logical metaphysical orders, and 
is inattentive to dialectical context. 
There is simply no need to say that Aquinas changed his 
about analogy of proportionality-though his mind had to 
be flexible enough to notice the different demands on an 
articulation of analogy different theological questions. Most 
of the time, Aquinas finds proportionality neither necessary nor 
sufficient for his theological purposes; the metaphysics of 
participation better answers to what is usually at issue, namely 
the causal responsibility for imitation, rather than the formal 
structure of similarity. However, when the reality of some 
causal relationship between God and creatures is already 
assumed, what is at stake is rather an account of how that 
relationship can be named and conceived in such a way as not 
to imply a determinate relation betViTeen creatures God, the 
notions of imitation or participation are inadequate on their 
own; these notions do not make explicit how it is possible to 
avoid the or more determinate relationship that Aquinas 
seeks to deny between creatures and God. In such a context 
Aquinas must have recourse to the notion of proportionality.31 
31 Or, as at 5Th I, q. 4, a. 3, he must have recourse to the notion of "analogy" in its 
original Greek sense of proportionality (that is, as describing a type of unity or sameness 
which is not reducible to specific or generic unity or sameness), as opposed to the sense 
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This is exactly what we find him doing in this passage from De 
Veritate, a text that is distinctive for its detail and language, but 
otherwise entirely with Aquinas says about 
analogy in divine naming in very different dialectical contexts.32 
of "analogy," more common in his usage, of signification with associated meaning 
(constituting a middle ground between univocation and equivocation). 
32 The author would like to thank the manuscript reviewers for The Thomist, as well 
as Thomas Joseph White and Stephen Brock, for comments on drafts, and David 
Burrell, Steven A. Long, and Thomas Osborne for helpful conversations about the 
central argument. Previous versions of this paper were delivered as the Aquinas Lecture 
at Emory University in September 2004, and for the Blackfriars Aquinas Seminar in 
February 2008. 
